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ABSTRACT
The paper represents a text version of the Australian Radiation Protection Society’s Boyce Worthley Oration,
which I had the privilege of delivering in 2014. The purpose of the presentation was to address the issue of
whether, from a risk communication perspective, enough radiation protection research had been conducted
and it was time to ‘draw the line’. The paper addresses this issue by focusing on the radiofrequency (RF)
risk communication domain, but is also applicable to radiation protection more generally. It first provides
a brief overview of both community concern about RF and the relative support from science regarding this
concern, where it is argued that the science does not provide support for such concern. It then looks at some
of the reasons for this discrepancy, and argues that it is due to the very complex, very ‘normal’ ways that
humans process information and create meaning from it, but which consequently also leads to error and limits
the applicability of specific communication strategies to the community more generally. Drawing the above
conclusions together the paper then argues that regardless of how certain RF health research outcomes are
or could in principle be in the future, there will remain a strong need to adapt to the complexity of people’s
interpretation of the science, and that this will necessitate both further RF risk communication and RF basic
science research; it concludes that no line can be drawn. On a more positive note the paper also looks at
what risk communication is doing in the RF domain, and provides some practical advice aimed at improving
risk communication outcomes.
(RF) electromagnetic radiation research, to draw
the line; or in other words to check whether further
research effort would benefit society, rather than
being merely an academic exercise. As a risk
communication perspective, this will be addressed
via detailed consideration of risk communication
itself, but as will be seen in the final section, the
answer to this has direct ramifications for RF
health research more generally. It should also be
noted that although focusing on RF, the discussion
and conclusions drawn are also directly relevant
to radiation protection more generally.

PROLOGUE
It was a great honour to be invited to deliver the
Australian Radiation Protection Society’s (ARPS)
2014 Boyce Worthley Oration, and in particular to
be associated with someone who has contributed
to the radiation safety domain in such a sustained
and community-centred manner. I felt too that
the task I was given was particularly appropriate
given Worthley’s lifelong contribution to the area,
as it was an opportunity to pause and consider
whether it was time, in terms of radiofrequency
Rodney Croft is Professor of Health Psychology
at the University of Wollongong, Director of the
Australian Centre for Electromagnetic Bioeffects
Research (ACEBR), and sits on the Main
Commission of the International Commission on
Non-Ionising Radiation Protection (ICNIRP). His
research focus is Bioelectromagnetics, for which
he employs a range of methodologies to address
both basic and social science issues in the field.
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The present paper represents an attempt to
communicate, in manuscript format, the 2014
Boyce Worthley Oration which addressed this
issue. As the Oration was provided in the form of
a conversation-like presentation to discussion with
the 2014 ARPS delegates, I clearly run the risk of
mixing formats and confusing the message that I
hope to communicate. I will thus attempt to follow
the narrative of the Oration as far as practicable,
which I hope the reader will understand may result

increasingly common to see community actions
designed to restrict RF exposure beyond the
restrictions imposed by governmental regulation
(for example “Stop Smart Meters”3 and “No Towers
Near Schools”4 are community organisations in
Australia developed for this purpose), and although
rare, it is becoming more common to see law suits
that attempt to obtain financial compensation for
health issues that are claimed to be caused by
RF exposure (e.g. McDonald versus Comcare5).
Particularly given the large number of RF emitting
devices in the modern world, if such claims are
correct, this would represent an important health
effect requiring not only the reconsideration of
governmental regulation, but also unambiguous
communication of such risks.

in less ‘detail’ than might otherwise be expected in
a journal paper, as well as necessitate changes to
the structure of the presentation in order to capture
the essence of it.
RF HEALTH AND COMMUNITY
CONCERN – WHAT’S THE PROBLEM?
With the growing use of RF-based technologies,
ranging from mobile phones, base stations,
wi-fi and smart metres to product identification
scanners and even wireless baby monitors, RF
is omnipresent in today’s society. RF exposure
is not new. However, while more traditional
sources of RF (such as FM radio) tend to be
viewed as benign by the community, there has
been strong community concern that these newer
RF technologies are causing harm. This concern
relates to a wide range of health effects, from
annoying sensations on the skin, to potentially
fatal diseases such as cancer. Accordingly the
degree of concern can vary greatly, from a
theoretical belief that has little or no impact on
daily life, to complete preoccupation with the RF
‘threat’. In the latter case, this has led to some
removing themselves from what they perceive as
the ‘RF world’, including sacrificing employment
and domicile, to move to a location, typically rural,
which is thought to have lower RF emissions.

THE SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE ON
RF AND HEALTH – IS THE PUBLIC
CONCERN JUSTIFIED?
However, when we consider the scientific
literature addressing the issue of potential health
effects from ‘low level’ RF (i.e. of or below the
magnitude typically encountered from mobile
telecommunication devices), the above concern is
not supported. There are of course a range of views
in science, but there is strong consistency across
the World Health Organisation, the International
Commission on Non-Ionising Radiation Protection
(ICNIRP) and the International Association of
Electronic and Electrical Engineers (IEEE), with
the latter two the only international RF Guidelines/
Standards setting bodies. Their determinations
are that there is no established evidence of harm
resulting from low-level RF exposure. I view these
as the most qualified and appropriate groups to
evaluate this complex issue, and the consistency
of their evaluations, in conjunction with my own
reading of the literature, provides me with strong
confidence in their conclusions.

It is difficult to determine how widespread this
concern is in the community, nor how strong. A
number of surveys have been conducted to obtain
data on the matter, but in order to provide adequate
representation of the community the questions
have had to be brief and relatively crude. However,
as an indication, a Special Eurobarometer report
on electromagnetic fields in 2010 found that 33%
of respondents reported that mobile phone base
stations affected their health ‘to a large extent’,
with values ranging from 79% in Italy to 6% in
Finland1. This does not necessarily mean that
the 6-79% believe that RF impacts importantly
on their lives, but it does provide an indication
that a large number of people believe, at least
from a theoretical perspective, that RF is indeed
harmful.

I will not deal with the RF health literature directly,
but given that there are a range of community and
academic members who argue that the ICNIRP
Guidelines and IEEE Standards are flawed, it
is important to highlight some of the reasons
given for this view, as well as my reasons for
not finding those arguments cogent. As far as I
am aware, the main reasons given for criticising
these Guidelines/Standards are: (1) The guidelines
do not take into account non-thermal effects of
RF; (2) The guidelines do not take into account
cumulative RF exposure (but rather only consider
acute exposures); and (3) The guidelines do not
evaluate the literature adequately.

This concern is highlighted in the ‘news’ media,
with reports often suggesting that technologies
such as mobile phones and base stations cause a
range of health issues. For example, in relation
to what is often referred to as Electromagnetic
Hypersensitivity (EHS; a condition whereby
people ‘report’ being adversely affected by RF),
the majority of media reports have claimed
that RF indeed causes the symptoms2. It is also
3

I do not agree with these views, and in support
of my perspective would note the following with
reference to the ICNIRP (RF) Guidelines (of which
I have greatest experience with):

– engaged by one group the communicator may be
attempting to make the community more concerned
about the ‘dangers’ of RF, and by another they may
be trying to allay fears of RF. Further, although the
motivations of those dictating the target cognitions
and/or behaviours can vary substantially (in both
of the above scenarios it may range from selfish
to altruistic), such motivations are not the domain
of the communicator.

1. Although the majority of RF-induced health
effects identified in the guidelines are thought to
be thermally mediated, the guidelines consider
all health effects. Indeed although mechanistic
knowledge is very useful, the guidelines are not
dependent on such knowledge – they consider
all established health effects caused by RF, and
specify exposure levels so as to avoid them;

For the present audience though an altruistic
motivation is assumed, such as would be expected
from a public health department, where the
communicator is tasked with producing a more
realistic appraisal of (and behaviours consistent
with) the relative risk of RF within the community,
so as to both maintain health and avoid unjustified
concern. The role of the risk communicator would
therefore be to employ the communication methods
of the profession to achieve, as far as possible, this
end. I take this to be a very standard view within
the radiation protection community, indeed it is
difficult to imagine there being any disagreement
over this approach. The problem is that given that
this approach is currently being employed both
here in Australia and internationally, and given
the ‘disconnect’ between community concern and
scientific consensus described above, this approach
is not working as effectively as we would like.

2. The Guidelines do in fact take into account
potential effects of chronic exposure. However,
as it is difficult to look at chronic exposure
experimentally in humans, the research has
had to extrapolate from epidemiological data
in humans and experimental designs in nonhumans (typically rodents and non-human
primates), with no health effects demonstrated
(beyond those at high RF levels observed
acutely); and
3. My personal experience with both ICNIRP and
IEEE is that they provide very considered and
appropriate evaluations of the literature. Indeed
the claims made and evidence proffered by
those with competing views are also considered
by ICNIRP and IEEE, and, depending on its
quality, form part of the evidence base that the
guidelines are derived from. The following
discussion is thus predicated on the assertion
that there is solid scientific consensus that lowlevel RF exposure, of or below the magnitude
encountered from typical telecommunications
devices such as mobile phones and base
stations, does not cause harm.

LIMITATIONS TO THE RISK
COMMUNICATION PROCESS – WHY THE
DISCONNECT?
I would argue that there are two primary reasons
for this failure, which I refer to as: (1) Semantics,
or the hidden (and inherent) difficulty of framing a
simple unambiguous statement; and (2) Complexity,
or the manner in which humans incorporate
information and manufacture meaning from it.
Before addressing each of these it is important
to take a step back and look at what how risk
communication has traditionally been seen as, as
this is the approach that I would argue is currently
engaged for RF risk communication.

RF HEALTH AND RISK
COMMUNICATION – WHAT ROLE DOES
RISK COMMUNICATION PLAY?
From the previous two sections a clear disconnect
can be seen; there is strong community concern
that low-level RF is harmful, and yet the scientific
consensus does not support this view. So what
is the role for risk communication in such a
scenario? At this point we begin to diverge from
the objectivity of science and need to incorporate
values. That is, risk communication is the science of
communicating, the science of altering cognitions
and/or behaviours, but it relies on others to specify
the target cognitions and/or behaviours. It follows
that in different scenarios risk communication will
be attempting to achieve very different objectives

In general terms, the ‘traditional’ risk
communication model posits that once science has
reached an unambiguous conclusion, that provision
of evidence supporting that conclusion is all that
is required to generate the appropriate cognitions
and/or behaviours in the target audience. There
is a vast literature dealing with the limitations of
this view in terms of risk communication more
generally, and correspondingly numerous models
that provide communication methods that lead
more effectively to the desired cognitions and/or
4

behaviours (see 6). While much of that generic
literature has bearing on the above disconnect
between science and perception, I will here
focus on two particular issues in relation to the
case of RF health communication. Specifically,
I will address the assumptions that science has
unambiguous conclusions to communicate, and
that an intelligent and unbiased recipient will
understand the message as intended. This, I hope,
will identify the most salient issues that we need to
consider in terms of NIR risk communication.

frame our determination in terms of such issues
as consistency of results, appropriateness of
the methodologies used to obtain those results,
and ideally the degree to which we understand
the mechanisms responsible for any RF-health
relations. However, this is equally problematic in
terms of providing a clear statement with which to
communicate. For example, if we are to say that
‘there is no evidence that low-level RF affects
health’, questions arise as to what we mean by
‘evidence’ and the causal nature of ‘affects’.
ICNIRP, for instance, looks for ‘established’
evidence when setting Guidelines, which is
typically based on independently replicated effects
with adequate methodology, and so there is nothing
inconsistent between the above statement based on
this interpretation, and another person asserting
that there is evidence that low-level RF does affect
health (in the sense of there being one study that
asserts that there is such evidence, regardless of
methodological adequacy or consistency with
other research outcomes). So even seemingly
simple terms like ‘evidence’ can be interpreted
in very different ways, making the notion of
designing simple statements to communicate our
determination highly problematic.

1. Semantics
It is typically assumed that given sufficient
scientific investigation (and evaluation of that
investigation), science will reach an unambiguous
determination that can then be communicated. Let
us assume that such an unambiguous scientific
determination has been reached in relation to
RF-Health. The question then becomes ‘How do
we frame that determination to make it suitable
for communication?’ At first sight this might
appear simple, and we may arrive at a conclusion
such as ‘low-level RF exposure does not affect
health’ (or depending on how conclusive we
think it is we may water this down using various
qualifiers). Let us assume that the research is very
conclusive though, as this will make it easier to
see the semantic difficulties that the scientistcommunicator faces.

Although this may appear to be ‘only semantics’,
this confusion between the two meanings of
‘evidence’ is indeed an issue that I often face when
trying to communicate with community members
that are very fearful due to what they interpret as
evidence that low-level RF harms people (and their
extrapolation to the view that standards setting
bodies such as ARPANSA and ICNIRP must be
disingenuous in their conclusions). Unfortunately
this semantic issue is ubiquitous in science, as
highlighted recently by the classification of RF
as a Class 2b Carcinogen by the International
Association for Research into Cancer (IARC).
IARC expands on this classification by referring
to it as ‘possibly carcinogenic’, and so although
appearing to provide a less technical and potentially
confusing classification, it raises substantial
questions concerning the meaning of ‘possibly’.
Indeed recent research attempting to determine
how people interpret the ‘possibly carcinogenic’
classification suggests that it is highly variable and
generally misunderstood, and that to remedy the
situation greater emphasis on narrative is required7.
This research suggests that greater complexity in
the statement is needed to produce the desired
interpretation (for example, by providing context
to help understand what is meant by ‘possibly
carcinogenic’, such as through comparisons with
other agents classified as possibly carcinogenic that
the target audience would be familiar with, such

There are a number of interpretations that even this
statement could rationally result in. For example,
strictly speaking it is an ontological statement,
commenting on what exists (as opposed to what
we know), and as has been demonstrated by
such greats as Descartes and Hume, we are not
justified in making such statements as we could be
‘being deceived by a malignant demon’ or merely
‘dreaming’ that the statement is correct. Thus for
the recipient with a philosophical background, the
statement may raise doubts because it is saying
something that they not only believe is false (i.e.
that we can be certain of what exists), but that the
philosophical literature also provides strong support
for. Unfortunately the situation is not resolved by
restricting the intention to epistemology, where
there is less focus on ‘what exists’ and more on
‘justified belief’ as to what exists, as the same
arguments can be used to conclude that no beliefs
can be adequately justified.
We may decide though to look at the issue in
terms of what the scientist is more familiar
with. That is, assuming that such difficulties are
‘merely philosophical’ and deciding how we can
5

as ‘coffee’), and thus that we need to move ‘away
from’ the simple statements that we were originally
trying to find, as they are far from unambiguous.

some and facilitate other aspects of the visual
stimulation, so as to enhance the signal to noise
ratio and improve the chances of accurate uptake
of the text; (2) Similar modulating influences
operate at the level of the occipital cortex (prior
to the text being identified as letters), with these
biased by factors such as emotional state; and (3)
At higher levels of processing, once letters have
been identified (or to be more accurate, interpreted
from the visual stimulation) and grammatical
structure is being discerned, similar modulatory
processes operate that are influenced by relatively
concrete non-conscious beliefs such as expected
frequencies of grammatical marks (e.g. within
a given grammatical context, is ‘.’ or ‘,’ more
likely), as well as by conscious and non-conscious
expectations as to the likely meaning of the text.
In other words, there is plenty of opportunity for
both conscious and non-conscious processes to
change ‘low-level RF exposure does not affect
health’ to ‘low-level RF exposure does affect
health’; after all, the human brain has over a billion
neurons (and over 10 trillion interconnections
between them) which shape the data arriving at
the senses into meaningful interpretations that
fit within a lifetime’s experience of other such
interpretations.

So even relatively concise, focused, scientific
summary statements may not be interpreted as
intended, and given that as we extend the summary
narrative to provide greater explanation we are also
increasing the number of potentially ambiguous
words and phrases, it is clear that designing our
scientific statements is a challenging task in its
own right.
2. Complexity
So why is it so difficult to communicate what
we would think of as simple clear statements,
particularly given that a computer program could
easily be written to deal reliably with such input
statements? The answer to this is often described
in a pejorative sense, where humanity as a whole
is seen as irrational, biased and flawed. Personally
I see this as a misunderstanding of human
nature, and rather would emphasise that these
‘weaknesses’ can equally be seen as strengths that
have been extremely effective in an evolutionary
sense, and that our difficulty communicating such
simple statements is in many ways due to the
sophistication or complexity of our cognitive and
affective processes. These are normal processes
that benefit even the most rational of scientists, and
I believe it is worth emphasising a small portion
of this complexity in order to better appreciate the
difficulty of communication.

Of course as professionals we would then check
that our interpretation of the statement was
consistent with the remaining text, perhaps we
would re-read it, and we would consider whether
our interpretation was consistent with other beliefs
that we have on the matter, and this would provide
an opportunity to test our original interpretation and
update it accordingly. This is a time-consuming and
effortful process though, and not something that
would be expected from the community recipient
of a risk communication message. Particularly
as we move from the ‘relatively’ simple text to
complex statements of meaning, there is ample
opportunity for unintended interpretations of our
message. A common example of this was given
above in relation to the word ‘evidence’, such
that the statement ‘there is no evidence that lowlevel RF exposure affects health’, could easily
be interpreted as meaning that there is not one
study that has reported such an effect, based not
on the text, but on prior experience that has led to
the belief that one such report ‘is’ evidence. This
could then rationally lead to suspicion about the
adequacy of the body providing the statement.
Importantly, this is ‘rational’ in the sense of making
logical conclusions based on premises (or previous
states of belief), rather than suggesting that an
accurate belief has been reached.

For example if we consider, even crudely, the
information processing steps required to be
cognisant of our ‘simple’ (written) scientific
statement, we see immediately that it is far from
simple. It is perhaps easiest to think of these
processes in terms of a number of discrete linear
steps. For example, as we read the above statement,
light reflected from the letters (and background)
strikes the retina before passing through the optic
nerve to the occipital cortex of the brain. Here
it undergoes a number of sequential processes
that extract features from the visual data until
sufficient to enable it to be matched against stored
representations of letters and words. Algorithms
are then employed to make grammatical sense
of these letters and words, and finally meaning
must be interpolated via comparison with stored
knowledge/belief of the world more generally.
However, the simple linear framework is an
important oversimplification. For example: (1)
Even at the level of the retina there are dynamic
(and imperfect) processes operating that inhibit
6

particular heuristic, such as scepticism towards
radiation protection bodies, then this will shape our
heuristic (such as by making it more difficult for
our simple scientific statement to be believed).

As well as being a potential source of error, this
constant attempt by the brain to interpret and
modify incoming data is a crucial part of what
has made humans successful. That is, it is not
only a way to help separate signal from noise, but
it also allows for very rapid responses that would
not otherwise be possible. For example if you
surprised an aggressive tiger in the wild, there
would not be sufficient time to process all of its
features in time to avoid the danger. However, by
sacrificing accuracy for speed we can enable fast
decisions (e.g. “large + orange + in-environmentwith-tigers = run”); emotional bias plays a large
role here, as mistaking a large toy for a tiger is
less likely an issue than mistaking a tiger for a
large toy, and so our experience-based emotional
responses help steer (in this case) our response
towards avoidance (as opposed to approach)
behaviours.

FROM CONFUSION TO RISK
COMMUNICATION – DEALING WITH
COMPLEX SCENARIOS
So, given the inherent difficulties of trying to
make unambiguous scientific statements as well as
dealing with the vastly different ways that people
interpret these statements, what can be done to
increase the alignment between message and
resultant belief? This is where social science plays
its role. Given the complexity of the messagebelief relation within an individual, and given that
this complexity is interacting with that of our social
environment (or the interactions of the interactions
of the individuals), social science is never going to
be in a position to completely determine this realm.
However, just as the individual does, it can develop
‘rules of thumb’ or heuristics that can improve the
predictability of the message-belief relation.

Similarly, heuristics, or mental shortcuts that
optimise speed/ease of interpretation over
accuracy, are used extensively by humans to solve
problems and make quick judgements, and for very
good reason. As an example, if we were to study
the background to all the stories we see on the
nightly news in sufficient depth to know whether
to believe what we are told, it is likely that we
would not have sufficient time to watch the nightly
news, let alone sleep. So the use of heuristics is
perhaps the only way for us to arrive at workable
conclusions about the world, even if necessarily
less than accurate. This is of course the same for
RF health and safety. The person watching the
news and hearing that ‘there is no evidence that
low-level RF exposure affects health’ cannot
spend sufficient time researching the literature
to know whether this statement is correct, and so
has to rely on heuristics that will necessarily differ
from one person to another. One person might be
guided by the heuristic that the news is always
accurate, while another might be guided by the
view that all RF expert bodies are controlled by
industry, with the resultant interpretations likely
to be antithetical.

At this point it may be useful to consider the Social
Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF), as it
offers one such heuristic that helps us understand
the difficulty of improving the message-belief
relation. It differs of course from the natural
sciences in that there is greater variability and
thus less predictive ability, and in particular its
‘elements’ (people) and ‘relations’ (social context)
are constantly evolving, but as per natural science
it attempts to identify laws that will, to a greater
or lesser extent, allow prediction.
SARF in many ways parallels the message-belief
processing stages of the individual that were
described above, but does so by incorporating
what we know about both the individual’s method
of deriving knowledge, and that of their social
environment. That is, it posits a cyclic process
whereby various types of intra-individual and
social influences will either amplify of attenuate
perceived risk, with the outcome of such processes
then playing a role in the next amplification/
attenuation stage relating to other types of intraindividual and social influences. The task of risk
communication in this case is thus to identify
the factors that work to amplify or attenuate the
perception of risk, and use this information to
help anticipate the consequences of a particular
statement, or ideally to help develop methods to
interface with these determinants of risk perception
to increase the chances of the desired outcome
(i.e. belief that is consistent with the scientists’

People thus utilise heuristics extensively to make
sense of the world, and although in general these
‘rules of thumb’ are greatly beneficial, a necessary
consequence of their use is that we make many
many mistakes as well. What is particularly
problematic is that as the heuristics are heavily
dependent on personal experience (in addition to
biology), whoever controls our experience has
the opportunity to make them more or less likely
to result in accurate determinations. For example
if the media or our social circle encourages a
7

determination).

Expertise and impartiality (the composition of
the expert group, how it was selected and how
impartiality was assured); Adherence with good
scientific practices (the procedure for arriving
at the conclusion, including how consensus was
determined); Consultation and participation
(procedures for accounting for conflicting views of
those outside of the expert group); and Adherence
with good reporting practice (balanced discussion
of the evidence, clear linkage between the evidence
and conclusions, uncertainty reported, and a plain
language summary).

Bringing this back to the scientists’ determination
that ‘low-level RF does not affect health’, this
approach may identify, for example, that the actual
scientific statement does not play a major role in
determining the recipient’s subsequent belief, but
rather that other non-science information does,
such as information about conflicts of interest.
Instead of focusing a risk communication message
on the scientific outcome, it may thus dedicate the
majority of the message to the issue of ‘conflict of
interest’, with the scientific statement representing
only a minor part. Similarly, it may identify that
within a particular culture, the similarity of RF
to other more familiar agents is an important
factor in helping the person interpret the science,
and so greater comparative information may be
emphasised, such as by explaining that coffee
and RF are in the same IARC 2b category, or by
explaining that RF is what FM radio transmissions
have been using for many years.

To me these are the same things that we as scientists
or radiation safety professionals would be looking
for when evaluating a risk communication
(assuming that we weren’t planning on spending
a few weeks reading the original literature itself),
and so I see the framework as providing strong face
validity. However it is noteworthy that few radiation
protection messages provide this information, but
instead focus more on the science itself. Indeed one
of the functions of the CORA framework is as an
evaluation tool for risk communication messages
more generally, providing an opportunity to see
whether information that is important to the
message recipient has been omitted. Of course this
framework does not ensure that the recipient will
adopt the intended message, but rather it gives the
recipient the opportunity to evaluate it effectively
and reach a more reasonable determination. For
example if the science underlying the determination
that ‘there is no evidence that low-level RF affects
health’ did indeed use poor methodologies, was
not equipped to deal with conflicting views or
was biased, then it would be reasonable to reject
the intended message. In my view however, that
would be a good outcome and testament to the
success of the framework.

CUTTING THROUGH THE
LIMITATIONS – SOME PRACTICAL RISK
COMMUNICATION ADVICE!
As suggested by the last section, the complexity
involved with moving from a message to a
belief is substantial, and no simply recipe can
be provided. However, a number of factors have
been identified that impact the way in which a
message will be interpreted, and this knowledge
provides sound principles with which to approach
risk communication that will improve the chances
of the message recipient’s belief matching the
scientists’ determination. Here I briefly describe
one such set of recommendations that are based
on solid theoretical understanding of how people
generate beliefs, have direct applicability to the
implementation of RF risk communication, and
that are empirically supported. This was developed
recently by Wiedemann and colleagues and is
referred to as the ‘Credibility of Risk Assessment’
(CORA) framework8.

In addition to this I would emphasise the
importance of communicating proactively.
Given the effect of pre-existing beliefs on how
we process new information (see above), it is
particularly difficult for the message, no matter
how well communicated it is, to allow the recipient
to make a reasonable judgement if they have
already taken the contra position. This is why,
for example, certain information is suppressed
by a court prior to a trial, as it is acknowledged
that the way that it is presented in the media can
make it difficult for a jury to arrive at a reasonable
conclusion. In many ways it thus makes sense
to focus communication on those who have not
already committed themselves to strong positions.
Working with schools and the community
more generally represent great opportunities to

In essence, this framework treats the message
recipient as an active agent trying to decide whether
to adopt the intended message, and emphasises in
the communication the (empirically-determined)
issues that best enable the recipient to make such
a determination. The framework emphasises
six categories of information that need to be
included in any risk communication: Overview
(or background information); Accountability
(the mandate of the group making the scientific
statements, as well as their funding sources);
8

provide the information required to help people
make informed decisions about risk, whereas
communication is unlikely to be useful where
strong bias (justified or otherwise) is present.

of the perceptions of the community. Thus even
if substantially stronger conclusions could be
reached regarding RF and health, this would
not satisfy the community.

Thus in terms of practical advice for risk
communication, although there is great complexity
in the way that information will be processed by
the message recipient, I would suggest that the
following simple steps will greatly enhance the
process:

2. The RF-Health risk communication research
is not sufficient to allay the fears of the
community.

•

Approach the task by viewing risk
communication as an endeavour to improve
people’s understanding of the science, rather
than as a way of passing on facts;

•

Treat the communication recipient as an active
agent trying to make sense of the information,
rather than someone whose beliefs need to
be changed. If we believe that our processes
of determining the message that we want to
communicate are sound, we should view risk
communication as an attempt to provide the
communication recipient with an opportunity
to consider the same steps of logic;

•

Use a strong framework, such as CORA, to
ensure that the issues that most people view
as important are appropriately dealt with.
Just as heuristics provide tangible benefits to
humans, such frameworks (where supported
by evidence) can be viewed as heuristics that
improve our ability to link science with the
community;

•

As argued above, the way that humans derive
meaning from data is exceedingly complex,
and at least in the foreseeable future, will not
be sufficiently determined (and controlled)
to enable science to effectively communicate
its findings to the community. Thus although
risk communication can improve the
situation and increase the number of people
whose beliefs match the determinations
of science, it is inconceivable that it could
remove the ‘disconnect’ between scientific
determinations and community perceptions.
Thus the community will continue to demand
further scientific investigation of the RFHealth domain, independent of the scientific
determinations themselves.
3. There is no line that can sensibly be drawn
in terms of health or risk communication
research.
From a risk communication perspective it
is relatively easy to see that our work will
never be complete (and thus that no ‘risk
communication’ line can be drawn), but
although less obvious from a health research
perspective, I would argue that the situation
is the same. This is because we are trying
to answer the community’s desire for better
understanding of potential radiation risks, and
it is not clear that it is for us (as opposed to the
community) to draw such a line. For certain
simple issues this may not be the case, such as
if the community wanted to know which of two
mountains had the highest peak, then having
determined this unambiguously, regardless of
how many ways it was re-asked or pressure put
on the scientist, there would be nothing further
that the scientist could offer.

Be proactive!
DRAWING THE LINE – A RISK
COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVE!

Having described in detail the difficulties associated
with communicating the relative risks associated
with RF (as well as some methods to improve this
communication), we can now consider whether it
is time to draw the line, to conclude that further RF
health research will not be of use to the community.
Drawing upon the discussion above, we can now
conclude the following:

However this is not the situation that we are faced
with, and the only way that the scientist can decide
to draw the line is via value judgements that go
outside their domain of expertise. For example in
the case of community concern that ‘long-term
low-level RF exposure causes cancer’, I can
draw on science to conclude that the experimental
animal and epidemiological human research has

1. The RF-Health research to date is not sufficient
to allay the fears of the community.
As argued above, this is not surprising given
that, regardless of how conclusive this research
might be on a scientific level, scientific
knowledge accounts for only a small portion
9

been strong, that there is no ‘positive evidence’ that
chronic RF exposure could potentially cause cancer
or that the extrapolation from animals to humans
was insufficient, and thus I would personally take
the view that it is sufficient to stop and draw a line
under RF cancer research. The problem is that the
last step (concluding sufficiency) is not scientific,
it is a value judgement. Indeed it is an axiom of
our research that we can never prove the null
hypothesis, and so a value judgement is necessarily
required in order to draw the line.
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The question thus is whether it is up to the scientist,
or up to the community to make such a value
judgement. From a public health perspective we
might have a better appreciation of the likelihood
of finding something important to public health
in the future, or we might be able to decide where
it is best to spend the community’s resources so
as to maximise the number of life-years within
the community, but whether this is what the
community values is a different matter, and one
beyond the expertise of both the RF-health scientist
and the risk communicator. Thus it is difficult to
see how, except in the limited sense where there is
a reference point such as ‘to maximise life-years’,
a line can justifiably be drawn under radiation
health research.
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